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HEALTH LAW-PRIVACY IN MEDICAL RESEARCH: A BOTCHED 
EXPERIMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
A few months ago, ALexis's physician diagnosed her with a rare, 
incurabLe, hereditary disease. 1 A few days ago, ALexis Lost her job as 
a premier teLevision news anchor. The onLy link between the two 
events was her participation in a medicaL research experiment. ALexis 
assumed her heaLth information wouLd remain confidentiaL, and 
never imagined that it wouLd end up in the hands of her empLoyer. 
Medical research is booming in the United States.2 Along with 
the boom has come the increased circulation of protected health 
information (PHI), sometimes to unauthorized recipients.3 Hospi­
tal-based research requires that a patient's PHI be viewed by hun­
dreds of individuals, including physicians, nurses, x-ray technicians, 
billing clerks, hospital administrators, insurance companies, re­
search sponsors, and other data specialists.4 Often, a patient or re­
search participant has no idea that his or her health information is 
being shared so widely.5 Currently, the medical research industry 
attempts to protect the privacy of medical research participants by 
policing itself, using either Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) or 
1. Alexis, a hypothetical character, guides this journey through the medical re­
search process as it winds through issues including federal regulations, informed con­
sent, and the legal process. 
2. From 1995 to 2002, "federal funding for research has more than doubled." Eve 
E. Slater, IRB Reform, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1402, 1402 (2002). Privately sponsored 
research has experienced similar growth. Id.; see also Barbara A. Noah, Bioethical Mal­
practice: Risk and Responsibility in Human Research, 7 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'y 
175, 175 (2004) (finding that nearly nineteen million people currently participate in 
clinical research trials). 
3. "Health information" is information that is created or received and "[r]elates 
to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an individuaL" 
45 c.F.R. § 160.103 (2005). "Protected health information" is health information that 
can assist in identifying an individual and is "(i) transmitted by electronic media; (ii) 
maintained in electronic media; or (iii) transmitted or maintained in any other form or 
medium." Id. 
4. Charity Scott, Is Too Much Privacy Bad for Your Health? An Introduction to 
the Law, Ethics, and HIPAA Rule on Medical Privacy, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 481,483 
(2000) (finding that during a typical hospital stay as many as 400 people may have 
access to a patient's medical records). 
5. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 82,462, 82,466 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164). 
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privacy committees, located within the walls of research 
institutions.6 
Failing to inform medical research participants of material PHI 
disclosure practices not only violates ethical research principles,7 it 
also exposes medical researchers to liability. This Note argues that 
those conducting medical research are liable in tort when they fail 
to properly protect research participants by informing them of the 
privacy risks associated with their participation in the research. 
Medical research participants must be adequately informed of com­
mon PHI disclosure practices along with the risks of such 
disclosures. 
Part I develops the profile of a hypothetical research partici­
pant, Alexis, introduced above. Part II addresses the role of IRBs, 
focusing on the doctrine of informed consent. This Part also dis­
cusses authorizations for the release of PHI under the Health Insur­
ance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).8 Part III 
discusses the impacts of technology on PHI and the increased use of 
business associate agreements in outsourcing both administrative 
functions and medical monitoring, illustrating common mistakes 
that lead to the disclosure of PHI to unauthorized recipients. Part 
IV argues that the medical community's reliance on IRBs, privacy 
boards, and the doctrine of informed consent fails to adequately 
protect privacy interests and advocates for the extension of a legal 
liability standard to protect the privacy interests of research partici­
pants. Part V discusses familiar theories of legal liability used to 
compensate research participants whose PHI has been mishandled 
or disclosed to unauthorized recipients. By way of illustration, this 
Part concludes with a brief application of the negligence standard of 
liability to provide a remedy for Alexis. 
6. "[An] IRB is an administrative body established to protect the rights and wel­
fare of human research subjects recruited to participate in research activities conducted 
under the auspices of the institution with which it is affiliated." DEP'T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS. (HHS), OFF. OF HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS, PROTECTING 
HUMAN RESEARCH SUBJECTS: INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD GUIDEBOOK (1993) 
[hereinafter HHS IRB GUIDEBOOK], available at hup://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/irb/irb_ 
chapter1.htm. 
7. See infra Part II. 
8. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104­
191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 
U.S.c.). 
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I. THE HYPOTHETICAL 
Alexis had been doing very well for herself in the competitive 
news anchor market; however, she began to notice subtle changes in 
her mood and behavior. As these symptoms persisted, she eventually 
contacted her physician, Dr. Brohman,9 who performed a genetic 
consultation IO and diagnosed Alexis with Huntington's disease. ll 
Huntington's disease is a progressive neurological disorder, 
which leads to death approximately fifteen years after onset of symp­
toms.I2 As the disease progresses, those afflicted with Huntington's 
will experience involuntary body movements, difficulty making eye 
contact, hesitant or slurred speech, and dementia.13 Alexis learned 
that her prognosis was grim. There is no known cure for Hunting­
ton's disease and no drug therapy is currently available to meaning­
fully delay progression of the disease or alleviate its symptoms. 14 
When Alexis first learned of her diagnosis, the effects of the dis­
ease on her career, family, and reputation were at the forefront ofher 
thoughts. Alexis's position as a prominent news anchor and commu­
nity personality prevented her from disclosing her illness. In fact, 
Alexis's employer made the decision to hire her based on her poten­
tial for long-term employment. 15 While Alexis struggled to cope with 
the news of her illness, she also wondered if there was some way that 
she could provide the medical community with valuable information 
to advance scientific understanding of her incurable disease. 
9. Dr. Brohman is a fictitious person. 
10. A genetic consultation provides information and resources for those at risk 
for genetic disorders. U.S. NAT'L LIBRARY OF MED., NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, DEP'T 
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, HANDBOOK: YOUR 
GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING GENETIC CONDITIONS 88 (2006), available at http://ghr. 
nlm.nih.gov/dynamiclmages/understandGenetics.pdf. 
11. Huntington's disease is a "hereditary disease that begins with occasional jerks 
or spasms" leading to "gradual loss of brain cells ... and mental deterioration." THE 
MERCK MANUAL OF MEDICAL INFORMATIQN 553 (2d ed. 2003). 
12. J. Stephen Huff, Huntington Chorea, EMEDICINE, Mar. 9,2005, http://www. 
emedicine.com/emerg/topic254.htm. 
13. MayoClinic.com, Huntington's Disease, http://www.mayoclinic.com!healthl 
huntingtons-diseaseIDS00401IDSECfION=2& (last visited Feb. 18, 2007); see also 
Huff, supra note 12 (describing further symptoms of Huntington's disease). 
14. Medline Plus, Huntington's Disease, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ 
ency/articie/000770.htm#Treatment (last visited Feb. 18, 2007); Huff, supra note 12. 
15. Alexis's employer believes that television viewers are comfortable with famil­
iar faces reporting the news. See Patricia Sullivan, ABC News Anchor was a Voice of 
the World, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 2005, at AI, available at LEXIS (stating that Peter 
Jennings was "a familiar face in millions of households for more than 40 years," en­
joying top world news "ratings for eleven of the past twenty years"). 
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Dr. Brohman began researching and identifying available 
clinical trials16 related to Huntington's disease and presented Alexis 
with a trial sponsored by GenoPharm Solutions, Inc. (Geno­
Pharm),17 a major pharmaceutical and genetic research corpora­
tiOn. 18 While reading a consent form that would allow Alexis to 
participate in the clinical trial, Alexis noticed that she would not re­
ceive financial compensation for her participation; however, she dis­
covered that Dr. Brohman would receive $8,000 for enrolling Alexis 
in the trial. 19 
After learning that she could help others afflicted with Hunting­
ton's by participating in a clinical research study, Alexis was eager to 
participate. She assumed, like many participants, that her status as a 
research participant would remain confidential. 
Unfortunately, Alexis's admirable intentions were met with the 
mishandling and disclosure of her private health information, a risk 
she certainly would have avoided had she been fully informed. As it 
happened, a disgruntled data specialist, having access to medical 
records of research participants, broadcast Alexis's medical records, 
along with the records ofhundreds ofother research participants, via 
16. Clinical trials investigate new drugs, medical devices, treatments, or surgical 
processes through prevention trials, diagnostic trials, or screening trials. Among the 
most common are those clinical trials focusing on treatments. Cinead R. Kubiak, Con­
flicting Interests & Conflicting Laws: Re-Aligning the Purpose and Practice of Research 
Ethics Committees, 30 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 759, 770 (2005). 
17. GenoPharm is a fictitious corporation. 
18. A physician will often suggest a clinical trial focusing on the specific condition 
of a patient. Kubiak, supra note 16, at 768. However, prospective participants can also 
begin their own investigation into available clinical trials by searching the Internet. 
Most Internet searches that seek information on clinical trials lead to the National Insti­
tutes of Health (NIH) clinical trials website containing a comprehensive list of available 
clinical trials, which may be sorted by condition, symptom, disease, sponsor, and loca­
tion. See generally ClinicaITrials.gov, Information on Clinical Trials and Human Re­
search Studies, http://www.clinicaltrials.gov (last visited Feb. 18, 2007). 
19. Kevin W. Williams, Managing Physician Financial Conflicts of Interest in 
Clinical Trials Conducted in the Private Practice Setting, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 45, 68 
(2004). In the institutional setting, payments to physicians and researchers enrolling 
patients into clinical trials range from $2,000 to $5,000. Id. In private practice, "phar­
maceutical companies may pay $7,000 to $8,000 per patient enrolled in a standard, in­
tensive 48-week protocol." /d. Dr. Brohman may justify a portion of this amount as 
financial compensation for Bay General Hospital and for his own research group's time 
and effort involved in tracking Alexis's progress through the course of the study. See 
id. However, Alexis did not know that Dr. Brohman and the hospital received a signifi­
cant portion of that amount purely as an incentive to enroll patients in the clinical trial. 
Id. (commenting that typical contracts with pharmaceutical companies usually provide 
payments for overhead costs associated with the clinical trial as well as supplying a 
significant portion for profit). 
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e-mail, to several news networks. 20 The data, which included infor­
mation about Alexis's participation in the research experiment, 
quickly became available to her co-workers, her colleagues at com­
peting networks, and her own network managers. Afterwards, Alexis 
lost her job and her group health insurance, and suffered irreparable 
damage to her reputation. Dismayed, Alexis must now consider her 
options. 
II. PROTECTING PARTICIPANTS IN THE MEDICAL RESEARCH 

COMMUNITY: INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS & THE HEALTH 

INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT 

The opportunity for physicians to conduct medical research in­
volving human subjects is a "privilege and not a right."21 Modern 
ethical principles have developed over time and researchers must 
now adhere to these principles while conducting clinical trials.22 
The Nuremberg Code, resulting from the trials of war criminals 
charged with performing research on involuntary human subjects in 
Nazi Germany, provides that "voluntary consent of the human sub­
ject is absolutely essential. ... [A] person ... should be so situated 
as to be able to exercise free power of choice."23 The Belmont Re­
port,24 written in 1979 by the National Commission for the Protec­
20. The disgruntled employee had just received a poor performance evaluation. 
Armed with access to vast amounts of sensitive health information on thousands of 
patients and with access to an e-mail program, this employee had sufficient resources 
and motivation to wreak havoc on the employer, and as a result, Alexis. See Amy M. 
Jurevic, When Technology and Health Care Collide: Issues with Electronic Medical 
Records and Electronic Mail, 66 UMKC L. REV. 809, 832 (1998) (commenting that e­
mail communications allow instantaneous communication to be broadcast to the 
world); see also id. at 809 (citing Doug Stanley & Craig Palosky, Medical Records Not 
So Secure, TAMPA TRIB., Feb. 18, 1997, at 1) (noting that the identities of 4,000 patients 
with AIDS were sent to two news organizations). 
21. Steven Peckman, A Shared Responsibility for Protecting Human Subjects, in 
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD: MANAGEMENT AND FUNCfION 16, 17 (Robert J. 
Amdur & Elizabeth A. Bankert eds., 2d ed. 2006). 
22. A comprehensive review of the ethical underpinnings of human subject re­
search is beyond the scope of this Note. For a well-developed article on the ethical 
underpinnings of research, see Kubiak, supra note 16, at 771-85 (providing analysis of 
the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki, the Belmont Report, and the inter­
national ethical guidelines established by the Council for International Organizations of 
Medical Science in conjunction with the World Health Organization). 
23. THE NUREMBERG CODE, 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREM· 
BERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 181-82 (1949), 
reprinted in NAT'L INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, REGULATION AND ETHICAL GUIDELINES, 
available at http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/nuremberg.html. 
24. NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROTECfION OF HUMAN SUBJECfS OF BIOMEDICAL 
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND 
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tion of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 
provides ethical guidelines for researchers at all federally funded 
institutions.25 The Belmont Report requires respect for an individ­
ual's autonomy-the right to make a choice free from obstruction.26 
In addition, the Belmont Report recognizes the need to balance the 
benefit to society that this research can provide against the risks to 
individual research participants.27 
Currently, the medical research community relies on the super­
visory role of IRBs and the doctrine of informed consent to protect 
research participants from the risks and potential abuses of medical 
research.28 In addition, the Health Insurance Portability and Ac­
countability Act (HIPAA)29 and its complementary Privacy Rule 
protect the private health information of health care consumers, in­
cluding research participants.3o 
A. Institutional Review Boards 
The National Research Act of 1974 created Institutional Re­
view Boards (IRBs) in response to concerns about research abuses 
at medical schools and hospitals.31 IRBs conduct reviews of pro-
GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTEcrION OF HUMAN SUBJEcrS OF RESEARCH (1979) [herein­
after BELMONT REPORT], available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/ 
guidancelbelmont.htm. 
25. Kubiak, supra note 16, at 777. 
26. BELMONT REPORT, supra note 24, at Part B(l). 
27. Id. at Part B. An experiment designed to benefit society at large may cause 
measurable harm to the individual research participants. To address these situations, 
the Belmont Report expresses that the protection of beneficence extends not only to 
the overall research enterprise but also to individual research participants. Id. at Part 
B(2). Beneficence can be stated as complements: "(1) do not harm and (2) maximize 
possible benefits." Id. Beneficence is stated easily enough; however, actual practice 
demonstrates that beneficence is sometimes difficult. 
28. Abuses in human subject research are not new. See generally JAMES H. 
JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT (1993) (explaining that fed­
erally funded researchers informed African-American men that they would be treated 
for their condition; however, researchers clearly intended to withhold treatment to 
study the extended effects of syphilis); U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ASSISTANT SEC'y FOR 
THE ENV'T, SAFETY, & HEALTH, HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS: THE DEPART­
MENT OF ENERGY ROADMAP TO THE STORY AND RECORDS (1995), available at http:// 
www.eh.doe.gov/ohre/roadmap/roadmap/index.html( describing de-classified informa­
tion that reveals that many research participants did not consent to federally funded 
research on the effects of radiation exposure). 
29. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104­
191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 
U.S.c.). 
30. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2005). 
31. National Research Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, § 474, 88 Stat. 343 (codi­
fied as amended in scattered sections of 5, 39, and 42 U.S.c.). 
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posed research protocols32 and must review and approve all human 
subject research conducted within a research institution.33 Since 
the adoption of federal legislation related to human subject protec­
tions, each federally funded institution that chooses to conduct 
human-subject research must maintain an IRB and create an envi­
ronment that "supports the highest ethical standards" for the pro­
tection of human subjects.34 In fact, the IRB is the only entity "in 
the research process that exist[s] solely to protect human 
subjects. "35 
IRBs are regulated by both the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) and the U.S. Food and Drug Administra­
tion (FDA).36 HHS regulations, often termed the Common Rule, 
apply to federally funded human subject research,37 whereas FDA 
regulations apply to research studying drugs, devices, and other 
products regulated by the FDA, regardless of federal funding sta­
tuS.38 With respect to IRB functions, the Common Rule and the 
FDA regulations are parallel,39 
32. Protocol is defined as "[a] precise and detailed plan for the study of a bio­
medical problem or for a regimen of therapy." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1466 
(27th ed. 2000). 
33. HHS IRB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 6, at 5-7; see also Peckman, supra note 21, 
at 17. 
34. Peckman, supra note 21, at 17. 
35. Mark R. Yessian, Reflections from the Office of the Inspector General, in IN­
STITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD: MANAGEMENT AND FUNCTION, supra note 21, at 9, 10. 
To be effective in their task of protecting human subjects, IRBs must function indepen­
dently of the pressures of the research institution and retain the "ultimate authority for 
the approval of research with human subjects," which is not always the case. Peckman, 
supra note 21, at 19. 
36. 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2005) (HHS: Informed Consent and IRBs); 21 c.F.R. § 50 
(2006) (FDA: Informed Consent); 21 c.F.R. § 56 (2006) (FDA: IRBs). 
37. 42 U.S.c. § 289(a) (2000) (IRB approval required for all research utilizing 
federal funds). 
38. See generally Appendix B: Significant Differences in FDA and HHS Regula­
tions for the Protection of Human Subjects, in INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD: MAN­
AGEMENT AND FUNCTION, supra note 21, at 515. 
39. For example, each IRB consists of at least five individuals with at least one 
member who has a primary interest in science and at least one member who has a 
primary interest in a non-scientific area. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107; 21 C.F.R. § 56.107. It is 
worth noting that the "non-scientific" position is not defined and may be filled by a 
member of the hospital administration (risk management, quality assurance, or compli­
ance) or perhaps an attorney not affiliated directly with the hospital. 45 C.F.R. 
§ 46.107; 21 C.F.R. § 56.107. An IRB may also invite individuals with specialized train­
ing, knowledge, or expertise to assist with reviews that require additional perspective. 
45 C.F.R. § 46.107; 21 C.F.R. § 56.107. 
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B. Informed Consent 
Essentially, an IRB reviews research protocols40 and ensures 
that informed consent documents provide research participants 
with material information.41 Informed consent, in the context of 
medical research, requires that research participants receive a 
"description of any reasonably foreseeable risks or discomforts to 
the subject."42 An informed decision cannot be made unless infor­
mation regarding the "purpose, methods, risks, benefits, and alter­
natives to the [proposed] research" is disclosed.43 The Common 
Rule and FDA regulations addressing informed consent require 
that "such consent [be obtained] only under circumstances that pro­
vide the prospective subject ... sufficient opportunity to consider 
whether or not to participate and that ... the possibility of coercion 
or undue influence [be minimized]. "44 Informed consent, operating 
effectively, ensures that individuals make an informed decision, al­
lowing the individual to determine whether they will participate in a 
clinical trial. 
Modern practice requires uniformity in research trials. Study 
sponsors, such as pharmaceutical corporations or device manufac­
turers, submit protocols and informed consent forms directly to the 
IRB without significant preparation or revision by the medical re­
searchers or physicians who actually conduct and supervise the tri­
als.45 After all, most medical research is conducted at multiple 
research sites,46 and studies must be conducted uniformly to pro­
mote efficiency and reliability of research data.47 However, the 
presence of multi-site research does not excuse an IRB from its pri­
mary responsibility of ensuring that research participants are fully 
informed of all material risks.48 
40. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.108-.111; 21 C.F.R. §§ 56.108-.111. 

41, 45 c.F.R. § 46.116; 21 C.F.R. § 50.20. 

42. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116. 
43. Ezekiel l. Emanuel et aI., What Makes Clinical Research Ethical?, 283 lAMA 
2701, 2706 (2000). 
44. 21 c.F.R. § 50.20. 
45. Sanford Chodosh, A Unified Human-Research Protection Program, in INSTI­
TUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD: MANAGEMENT AND FUNcnON, supra note 21, at 13, 14. 
46. Kubiak, supra note 16, at 788. Research centers consist of "hospitals, aca­
demic centers, managed care organizations, federal and state government agencies, and 
corporations, including pharmaceutical and device manufacturers." [d. 
47. Chodosh, supra note 45, at 15. 
48. ld. 
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C. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act49 
When research requires the collection of medical data, "federal 
regulations unquestionably require that ... IRB[s] approve the con­
ditions for access to ... medical record[s] and the procedures for 
protecting confidentiality."50 Title II of HIPAA focuses on protect­
ing the health information that health care institutions obtain and 
store. The administrative simplification provisions in Title II re­
quire HHS to establish national standards for electronic health care 
transactions.51 The regulations associated with HIPAA that protect 
personally identifiable PHJ52 are commonly referred to as the Pri­
vacy Rule. 
The Privacy Rule encompasses more than just the require­
ments of the Common Rule and FDA regulations; however, in 
medical research, where both the Privacy Rule and the Common 
Rule or FDA regulations apply, the stricter requirements of each 
must be followed.53 The Privacy Rule requires that research par­
ticipants authorize, in writing, the disclosure of their PHJ.54 Medi­
cal researchers, however, often resent implementing provisions of 
HIPAA and its associated regulations. 55 
Written authorization is most commonly sought using a Patient 
Authorization Form, also referred to as a Privacy Rule Authoriza­
49. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104­
191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 
U.S.c.). 
50. Robert J. Amdur, The Limits of Institutional Review Board Authority, in IN­
STITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD: MANAGEMENT AND FUNCTION, supra note 21, at 30, 31. 
51. See HHS, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Overview, http://www.cms. 
hhs.govlHIPAAGenInfo (last visited Feb. 18, 2007). 
52. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2005) (defining individually identifiable health informa­
tion as "any information, including demographic information collected from an individ­
ual, that ... is created or received by a health care provider ... [and] identifies the 
individual; or ... with respect to which there is a reasonable basis to believe that the 
information can be used to identify the individual"). 
53. Ellen Holt, The HIPAA Privacy Rule, Research, and IRBs, ApPLIED 
CLINICAL TRIALS, June 2003, at 48, 50; available at http://www.actmagazine.com/applied 
c1inicaltrials/data/articlestandard/appliedclinicaltrialsl222003/58533/article.pdf. 
54. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 ("Disclosure means the release, transfer, provision of, ac­
cess to, or divulging in any other manner of information outside the entity holding the 
information."); 45 c.F.R. § 164.508 (requiring written authorization as a general rule). 
But see 45 c.F.R. § 164.512 (stating that authorization is not required when use and 
disclosure is required by law, public health, abuse or domestic violence, health over­
sight, judicial or administrative proceedings, law enforcement, crimes on premises, and 
emergencies). 
55. Mary Durham, How Research Will Adapt to HIPAA: A View from Within the 
Healthcare Delivery System, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 491, 492 (2002). 
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tion.56 However, authorization is distinct from informed consent. 
Informed consent seeks an "individual's [permission] to participate 
in the research [itself,]" whereas an authorization represents an in­
dividual's permission to use or disclose PHI for research or medical 
purposes.57 As discussed earlier, an informed consent form de­
scribes the research study and its anticipated risks and benefits.58 
Not insignificant to the informed consent requirements, however, is 
the duty to describe the methods used to protect the privacy of 
records.59 
Although the Privacy Rule requires that authorizations contain 
specific core elements,60 it does not require that an authorization be 
separate from informed consent.61 An authorization, therefore, 
may be combined with an informed consent document.62 If an in­
formed consent document is combined with an authorization to dis­
close PHI, the Common Rule and FDA regulations "require IRB 
review of the combined document. "63 Thus, the IRB has the dual 
role of reviewing not only the research protocol contained in the 
informed consent, but also the authorization.64 The Privacy Rule 
and IRBs both afford protection to research participants; however, 
an understanding of current practices in medical research is neces­
sary to determine whether these protections are sufficient. 
56. NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, NIH PUBL'N. No. 04-5529, HIPAA AUTHORIZA· 
TION FOR RESEARCH 1 (2004) [hereinafter HIPAA AUTHORIZATION FOR RESEARCH], 
available at http://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/pdf/authorization.pdf (listing core el­
ements of research authorization and sample authorizations). 
57. Id. at 1, 2-4. 
58. Id. ; see supra Part n.B. 
59. See HIPAA AUTHORIZATION FOR RESEARCH, supra note 56. 
60. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508 (2005) (stating that an authorization form must contain, 
among other items, identification of the PHI to be used or disclosed, identification of 
the persons authorized to make the use or disclosure, identification of the authorized 
recipients of the PHI, a description of each purpose for use or disclosure, an expiration 
date, and a statement related to the potential that the PHI is subject to re-disclosure by 
the recipient). 
61. Id. 
62. HIPAA AUTHORIZATION FOR RESEARCH, supra note 56, at 1. 
63. Id. 
64. Even if the informed consent and authorization remain separate, "[i]t is likely 
that IRBs will be primarily involved in acting on requests for waiver or alteration of the 
Authorization requirement." NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, NIH PUBL'N No. 03-5428, INSTI­
TUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS AND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 2 (2003), available at 
http://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/pdf/IRB_Factsheet.pdf. Since the authorization 
form must comply with core requirements, the eventual review of authorizations by 
independent review boards, such as an IRB or privacy board, is quite foreseeable. Holt, 
supra note 53, at 48. 
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III. CURRENT PRACTICES IN MEDICAL RESEARCH INCREASE 
DISCLOSURE OF PHI 
Technology is prevalent in the practice of medicine65 and 
healthcare institutions continue to aggressively pursue technologi­
cal advancements in order to increase efficiency, facilitate world­
wide communication, and reduce costS.66 With the increasing need 
and ability to pass information quickly between agencies and heath 
care entities, medical research requires increased privacy 
protection.67 
A. Technology in Medical Research 
The most common operations using the protected health infor­
mation of research participants are labeled "backroom," or admin-­
istrative, operations and include billing, insurance claims 
processing, and transcription.68 Medical billing and transcription 
involve relatively simple technologies, such as the Internet and cus­
tomized word processing and spreadsheet software.69 Transcription 
of medical reports is big business, generating revenues in excess of 
$15 billion per year.70 However, the use of more sophisticated tech­
nology by medical researchers for non-administrative purposes, 
such as remote monitoring of a patient's vital statistics, is now also 
prevalent. 
Disease management is the most rapidly growing sector in 
health care and includes active monitoring of patient progress and 
coordination of care between multiple researchers.?1 Newer tech­
nology enables a physician or researcher to remotely monitor 
health information, such as a patient's heart rate.?2 Advanced tech­
nologies, such as mobile-to-mobile or machine-to-machine (M2M) 
65. See, e.g., Thomas R. McLean, The Offshoring of American Medicine: Scope, 
Economic Issues and Legal Liabilities, 14 ANN_ HEALTH L. 205, 234-35 (2005) (describ­
ing mobile to mobile technology in patient monitoring and health care instructions). 
66. Barbara Williams, Virtual Web Wave of the Future: Integration of Healthcare 
Systems on the Internet, 76 N.D. L. REV. 365, 365 (2000). 
67. June Mary Zekan Makdisi, Commercial Use of Protected Health Information 
Under HIPAA's Privacy Rule: Reasonable Disclosure or Disguised Marketing?, 82 NEB. 
L. REV. 741, 743 (2004). 
68. McLean, supra note 65, at 229. 
69. Id. at 231. 
70. Id. at 230. Most aspects of medicine and research require the documentation 
of altered medical conditions, adjusted treatment orders, and billing adjustments based 
on those changes. Id. 
71. Id. at 233. 
72. Id. at 234-35. 
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devices, are becoming essential in monitoring medical conditions.73 
Also essential is the ability to perform administrative functions effi­
ciently at low cost. 
B. Business Associates 
Although unknown to most research participants, it is common 
practice in the medical research community to use what are known 
as "business associates" to perform certain administrative opera­
tions in an effort to reduce costs or to streamline administrative 
processes.74 A "business associate" is defined as a business or indi­
vidual that contracts to perform administrative functions or services 
that require the disclosure of PHU5 HIPAA requires that the 
health care or research institution enter into an agreement with the 
business associate to safeguard identifiable health information used 
by or disclosed to the business associate.76 Under a business associ­
ate contract, a business associate steps into the shoes of the health 
care institution and is, therefore, not permitted to use or disclose 
health information in any way that would violate the Privacy 
Rule.77 
Further cost savings in medical research are realized by using 
offshore business associates. Because of the economic incentives 
associated with "offshoring," an increasing number of administra­
73. [d. Wireless communication devices, such as snap-on mobile phone accesso­
ries, are able to monitor heart rates and provide that information, by way of a radio 
transmitter, to a remote location where a medical researcher can analyze the data in 
real time using another mobile device, such as a personal digital assistant. See SONY 
ERICSSON, M2M: EXPANDING WIRELESS POSSIBILITIES 10 (2005), available at http:// 
www.sonyericsson.com!spg.jsp?cc=us&1c=en&ver=4002&template=phl&zone=ph (fol­
low "M2M Brochure" link); see also Sony Ericsson, Facilitate Remote Care for 
Patients, http://www.sonyericsson.com/spg.jsp?cc=us&1c=es&ver=4002&template=pal_ 
5&zone=pa&prid=13&rid=15&lm=pal&cid=140 (describing health care applications 
for M2M technology) (last visited Feb. 18, 2007). 
74. HHS OFF. OF CIVIL RIGHTS, SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 3 
(2003) [hereinafter SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE], available at http://www. 
hhs.gov/ocr/privacysummary.pdf. 
75. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2005). A business associate may be located in the same 
town or in an international location, so long as the associate is not considered a member 
of the related health care entity. Id. 
76. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502(e), 164.504(e). 
77. SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE, supra note 74, at 3. HHS pro­
vides sample business associate agreements to assist health care entities. HHS Off. of 
Civil Rights, Sample Business Associate Contract Provisions, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/ 
hipaa/contractprov.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2007). HIPAA requires that health care 
institutions, and their business associates, maintain reasonable and appropriate safe­
guards to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of personal health information. 
Jurevic, supra note 20, at 815. 
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tive operations are being sent abroad for completion.78 With the 
increase in medical monitoring comes an expanded reliance on out­
sourcing, resulting from the need to coordinate medical personnel, 
data, data analysis, and feedback.79 In turn, an increased reliance 
on outsourcing expands the likelihood that a research participant's 
PHI will be disseminated to unauthorized recipients.8o 
C. 	 Mishandled Health Information: The Risk of Using Business 
Associates 
The very nature of electronic medical records increases the risk 
that PHI will be mishandled or disclosed to an unauthorized recipi­
ent.81 Electronic records combine data stored in multiple computer 
systems; thus, large amounts of data can be accessed from a single 
location.82 Medical records contain a wealth of personal informa­
tion, including an individual's family history, genetic test results, 
history of any prior drug use, and treatment of any sexually trans­
mitted diseases.83 Unfortunately, electronic storage of health 
records allows cross-referencing of medical data in ways not origi­
nally intended, permitting easy and inexpensive searching, data 
mining, and distribution of PHI.84 Yet, despite the availability of 
information and the ease of filtering and sorting information, more 
78. McLean, supra note 65, at 212-13. Offshoring is beneficial where a favorable 
wage-benefit differential exists, where cost effective telecommunications are present, 
and where numbers of educated, English-speaking individuals are concentrated in other 
countries. Id. at 212-15. Using these factors to identify favorable areas of the world to 
satisfy the needs of the medical research community, China, Russia, and India are 
"merging rapidly into the global labor market" for outsourcing. Id. at 215. 
79. 	 Id. at 233-37. 
80. Barbara Von Tigerstrom, Protection of Health Information Privacy: The Chal­
lenges and Possibilities of Technology, 4 ApPEAL 44,46 (1998) (finding the number of 
uses of medical information to mean that the "widespread dissemination of personal 
information is inevitable, and this makes it difficult to control the use of such 
information"). 
81. 	 Jurevic, supra note 20, at 812. 
82. 	 Id. 
83. 	 Id. at 808. 
84. Id. at 812. For example, a banker who obtains access to state health records 
improperly secured (and therefore mishandled) may cross-reference a list of patients 
known to have cancer with the bank's loan register so that the loans of patients with 
cancer may be called in for immediate payment. Id. at 809 (citing E. Bartlett, RMS 
Need to Safeguard Computerized Patient Records to Protect Hospitals, 15 Hosp. RISK 
MUMT. 129, 132 (1993». 
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established threats continue to expose medical information to unau­
thorized and unintended recipients.85 
The most common threat to health information privacy contin­
ues to be sabotage by disgruntled employees, including destruction 
of hardware and software, purposeful entering of incorrect data, de­
letion or alteration of data, or the planting of "logic bombs"-pro­
grams that destroy data or computer applications.86 Human error, 
such as the loss of laptop computers used by healthcare workers 
and medical researchers, also leads to the disclosure of PHI.87 Per­
haps the most obvious, and egregious, example of disclosure of PHI 
to unauthorized sources is the selling of data contained in large 
databases.88 In addition, researchers can encounter scenarios in 
which an offshore business associate threatens to post PHI on the 
Internet (a clear violation of HIPAA) in order to force resolution of 
a contract dispute.89 
Revisiting Alexis 
Dr. Brohman chose to use a mobile device to monitor Alexis's 
symptoms during the course of the clinical trial because GenoPharm 
desired to develop a drug remedy targeting specific symptoms of 
Huntington's disease. The hospital hosting Dr. Brohman's clinical 
85. Id. at 809 (citing E. Bartlett, RMS Need to Safeguard Computerized Patient 
Records to Protect Hospitals, 15 Hosp. RISK MGMT. 129, 129-40 (1993» (providing mul­
tiple examples of breaches of privacy with respect to medical records). 
86. Id. at 809-12. Additional threats include physical problems with technology, 
such as outdated or fragile equipment, or physical theft by employees. Id. at 812. 
Hackers, who gain access to computer systems and browse for valuable information, 
may also gain access to PHI. Id. Trojan horses, programs that appear to perform a 
valid function but operate underneath to uncover confidential information such as net­
work passwords or access paths to restricted data, can also be planted by hackers or 
disgruntled employees, without a noticeable impact on system performance. Id. 
87. Carol Ann Quinsey, Information Security-An Overview, AM. HEALTH MED. 
INFO. MGMT. ASS'N, Aug. 2003, available at http://library.ahima.orglxpedio/groups/ 
public/documents/ahima/bok1_021875.hcsp?dDocName=bok1_021875 (replacing Mary 
D. Brandt, Information Security-An Overview, AM. HEALTH MED. INFO. MGMT. 
ASS'N, June 1996). 
88. Bob Sullivan, Choice Point to Pay $15 Million over Data Breach, 
MSNBC.cOM, Jan. 26, 2006, available at LEXIS. ChoicePoint, Inc., a data warehouser, 
settled charges for failing to protect consumers' confidential personal information. Id. 
ChoicePoint sold information on 163,000 individual consumers and settled with the Fed­
eral Trade Commission to pay a $10 million fine. Id. In addition, ChoicePoint will 
spend $5 million to establish a fund to aid victims. Id. To date, this is the largest pen­
alty imposed for failing to properly secure data. Id. 
89. McLean, supra note 65, at 232 (finding that this scenario experienced by the 
University of California at San Francisco was not an isolated event, leading six states to 
contemplate banning outsourcing to avoid such situations). 
2007] PRIVACY IN MEDICAL RESEARCH: A BOTCHED EXPERIMENT 549 
trial entered into a business associate contract with an offshore com­
pany to provide administrative and patient monitoring services. 90 
Alexis believed her medical information would remain in the hospi­
tal. She was unaware that her PHI would be outsourced to business 
associates. Because privacy of her medical condition was important 
to her, Alexis would not have participated in the clinical trial, had she 
been adequately informed. 
IV. WHEN THE MEDICAL COMMUNITY FAILS TO ADEQUATELY 
INFORM RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS, A LEGAL STANDARD OF 
LIABILITY MUST BE ApPLIED 
After examining privacy interests in personal health informa­
tion, this Part analyzes the current protections provided by the 
medical research community. This Part also argues that the protec­
tions provided by the medical research community, such as in­
formed consent or IRB oversight of medical research, are 
insufficient. Therefore, applying legal standards of liability is neces­
sary to protect research participants. 
A. Privacy Rights in Medical Records 
The Supreme Court addressed privacy in integrated medical 
systems in Whalen v. Roe.91 In Whalen, a state statute permitted 
the state to track the distribution of certain drugs by obtaining cop­
ies of prescriptions that contained personal information of those pa­
tients receiving them.92 In this case, the personal information was 
kept secure on an off-line computer that was locked in a room sur­
rounded by a wire fence and monitored by an alarm system.93 The 
Supreme Court recognized the various safeguards used to control 
access to personal information94 and concluded that, in this case, no 
90. See, e.g., PORTECK, SOLUTIONS FOR PROVIDERS 2, available at http://www. 
compumedbilling.com/brochures/Providers_Brochure.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2007) 
(listing available services, including assisting clients with "process improvements, tech­
nology automation and offshore implementation"); Porteck, Contact Us, http://www. 
porteck.com/contactus.htm (last visited Feb. 18,2007) (listing offices both in the United 
States and India); see also MedValue Offshore Solutions, Inc., Medical Claims Process­
ing-Claim Indexing-HCFA Data Entry, http://medvaluebpo.com (last visited Feb. 18, 
2007) (advertising processing and processing support services, including "HIPAA 
Compliance"). 
91. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
92. Id. at 592-94. 
93. Id. at 594. 
94. Id. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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privacy interests were significantly infringed by the state statute.95 
However, the Court recognized a "threat to privacy implicit in the 
accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in [massive] 
computerized . . . files. "96 The Court made clear that it was not 
required to decide the privacy issues arising specifically from un­
warranted disclosures of private health information, whether inten­
tional or unintentiona1.97 In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan 
recognized that an individual's interest in preventing disclosure of 
personal information is a privacy right, even though it was not seri­
ously invaded in the specific factual circumstances presented in 
Whalen. 98 Justice Brennan could not say, however, that different 
factual circumstances would not demonstrate a need for restrictions 
on the collection and disclosure of personal health information.99 
Rather, he recognized that the "central storage and easy accessibil­
ity of computerized data vastly increases the potential for abuse. "100 
As discussed above, significant technological advancements, 
enabling the efficient and widespread dissemination of medical 
records, have occurred since the Court decided Whalen in 1977.101 
Therefore, it is unlikely that Whalen will shield the unauthorized 
disclosure of PHI from being considered a violation of privacy. In 
fact, Justice Brennan stated that broad dissemination would 
"clearly implicate constitutionally protected privacy rights."102 Ul­
timately, Whalen left open the issue of the impacts of expanded 
technology on broad circulation of PHI. 
In addition, the Privacy Rule103 provides that individuals have 
the "right to adequate notice of the uses and disclosures" of their 
PHJ.104 The description of the disclosure of PHI must include suffi­
cient detail so that a research participant is aware of both required 
95. Id. at 597 (majority opinion) (finding that states are given "broad latitude in 
experimenting with possible solutions to problems of vital concern," such as misuse of 
dangerous drugs). 
96. Id. at 605. 
97. Id. at 605-06. 
98. Id. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
99. /d. at 607. 
100. Id. 
101. See supra Part III.A. 
102. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
103. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2005). 
104. Stacey A. Tovino, The Use and Disclosure of Protected Health Information 
for Research Under the HIPAA Privacy Rule: Unrealized Patient Autonomy and Bur­
densome Government Regulation, 49 S.D. L. REV. 447, 474 (2003) (quoting 45 C.F.R. 
§ 164.520(a)(1». 
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and permitted disclosures. lOS The requirement to inform an indi­
vidual of the disclosures of PHI further supports the notion of a 
right to privacy in personal health information.106 
Further evidence of this right can be found both in the require­
ments of HIPAA and the doctrine of informed consent. After all, 
HIPAA establishes an authorization requirement to inform re­
search participants of their privacy rights as well as the risks associ­
ated with the use and disclosure of PHI.107 Informed consent only 
requires that individuals understand the potential risks of participa­
tion in the research protocol.108 As previously discussed, authoriza­
tion focuses on "making patients clearly understand how their 
information will be used for research activities, [and] the risk that 
[ this] information could be re-disclosed by researchers and other 
recipients."109 
B. 	 Authorization Forms Fail to Adequately Inform Research 
Participants of PHI Disclosure Risks 
If privacy notices describing the general use and disclosure of a 
research participant's PHI are too lengthy, or if the sections con­
taining research-specific disclosures are too abbreviated, an individ­
ual is unlikely to know whether his or her PHI will be used or 
disclosed while participating in the clinical tria1.110 The Privacy 
Rule requires that research authorizations contain certain elements 
and statements.111 For example, the name or identity of those who 
are authorized to use a research participant's PHI must be dis­
closed.1l 2 Researchers must also identify potential risks associated 
with disclosures of PHI to individuals or entities outside the re­
search institution, because those subsequent disclosures may no 
longer be protected by the Privacy Rule.113 Alarmingly, a general 
statement to the effect that PHI may no longer be protected once 
disclosed by a health care institution or research program is suffi­
105. 	 45 C.F.R. § 164.520(b)(1)(ii)(D). 
106. In addition, the term "Privacy Rule" may, by its name, stress the recognition 
and importance of a privacy right and conclude that its provisions are aimed to protect 
a patient's, or research participant's, privacy interest in identifiable health information. 
107. 	 See supra Part II.C. (explaining requirements of authorization under 
HIPAA). 
lOS. See supra Part ILB. (describing the doctrine of informed consent). 
109. 	 Tovino, supra note 104, at 474. 
110. 	 Id. at 476. 
111. 	 45 C.F.R. § 164.50S(c) (2005). 
112. 	 Id. § 164.50S(c)(1)(ii). 
113. 	 [d. § 164.50S(c)(2)(iii). 
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cient to satisfy the Privacy Rule's requirement to warn of the re­
disclosure risk.1 l4 HIPAA does not require researchers to explain 
to patients or research participants the associated risks of re-disclo­
sure or to identify those who may actually receive re-disclosed PHI. 
Examining a sample authorization form provided by HHS 
raises serious doubt as to whether a prospective research partici­
pant can accurately gauge the risks of PHI disclosure when viewed 
in light of actual practices in the medical research environment.115 
The following language has been deemed acceptable by HHS: 
"Those persons who receive your health information may not be 
required by Federal privacy laws (such as the Privacy Rule) to pro­
tect it and may share your information with others without your 
permission."116 The language eviscerates the entire concept of pri­
vacy to the extent that the text appears to articulate privacy rights, 
only to take them away. 
Further confusion arises because some individual research in­
stitutions use separate authorization forms while others combine 
the authorization with an informed consent form.117 In either 
event, authorization forms, or portions of consent forms seeking au­
thorization, "fumble when attempting to convey [potential loss of 
privacy caused by subsequent disclosures] ... and the patient read­
ing the form may fail to understand that the recipient of her infor­
mation is not required by the Privacy Rule to protect her 
information. "118 
General language, such as "reasons we might use or share your 
health information are: [t]o do the research described above [and] 
... [f]or treatment, payment, or health care operations," does not 
accurately inform a prospective research participant of actual dis­
114. Tovino, supra note 104, at 466 (commenting that HIPAA merely requires 
that the authorization form contain re-disclosure language). 
115. HIPAA AUTHORIZATION FOR RESEARCH, supra note 56, at 2. 
116. Id. However, case law is absent to determine whether reliance on HHS form 
language shields entities from liability stemming from re-disclosure of PHI. See PART· 
NERS HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, GENERAL CONSENT FORM TEMPLATE 8-9 (2005), avail­
able at http://healthcare.partners.org/phsirb/consfrm.htm (follow the "General Consent 
Form Template" hyperlink) ("Some people or groups who get your health information 
might not have to follow the same privacy rules that we follow. We share your health 
information only when we must, and we ask anyone who receives it from us to protect 
your privacy. However, once your information is shared outside of Partners, we cannot 
promise that it will remain private."). 
117. Clinical research programs at Massachusetts General Hospital, for example, 
use a single consent and authorization form. E.g., PARTNERS HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, 
supra note 116. 
118. Tovino, supra note 104, at 467. 
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closure practices, especially those involving business associates in 
offshore locations.1l9 Authorization and consent forms that use ter­
minology such as "research purposes" to encompass actual prac­
tices of disclosing PHI neither inform nor warn a prospective 
research participant about known risks of mishandled PHI inherent 
in medical research. When medical researchers fail to adequately 
inform participants of risks, a negligently injured plaintiff com­
monly looks to the doctrine of informed consent to establish that 
researchers owed the plaintiff a duty of care. 
C. Informed Consent in the Research Community 
In Moore v. Regents of the University of California, the Su­
preme Court of California expanded the doctrine of informed con­
sent when it held that "a physician has a ... duty to disclose all 
information [that is] material to the patient's decision," and all in­
formation "that may affect the physician's professional judg­
ment."120 In Moore, the patient-subject was instructed to return to 
the hospital to provide additional tissue samples.121 The plaintiff 
complied, believing that such samples were necessary in the ordi­
nary course of his leukemia treatment.122 The plaintiff had no rea­
son to believe that the additional tissue would be used solely to 
benefit researchers in making a profit.123 
By requiring informed consent in instances that might affect a 
researcher's professional judgment, Moore demonstrates an appar­
ent willingness to expand informed consent beyond the physical 
risks associated with the trial to include harms to dignity and eco­
nomic interests. Failure to disclose such interests might expose 
those involved in medical research to either a lack of consent claim, 
or allegations of breach of the physician's fiduciary duty to inform 
the patient-subject of material risks inherent in the research experi­
ment.124 Arguably, a physician's professional judgment may not af­
fect the risk of a research participant's PHI being mishandled. 
119. PARTNERS HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, supra note 116, at 9-10 (explaining that 
those people outside of the institution who may access PHI are "[p]eople or groups that 
we hire to do certain work for US, such as data storage companies, our insurers, or our 
lawyers[;] [fjederal and state agencies ... [t]he sponsor(s) of the research study, and 
people or groups it hires to help perform this research study"). 
120. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990) (empha­
sis added). 
121. Id. at 481. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 483. 
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Nonetheless, a non-physical risk can still be material to a patient's 
decision to participate in research and should therefore be 
disclosed. 
D. Establishing a Legal Basis to Protect Research Participants 
In addition to the Moore decision, several other courts have 
addressed privacy rights in the context of medical research.125 
These cases demonstrate that a legal standard of liability is needed 
to supplement the medical research community's continued reli­
ance on informed consent and IRB oversight. In Greenberg v. Chil­
dren's Hospital Research Institute, researchers obtained patents for 
genes studied in the research of Canavan's Disease, a relatively 
rare, but fatal, inherited brain disorder.126 Parents allowed tissue 
and autopsy samples to be taken from their children who were af­
flicted with the disorder; however, the parents did not know that 
the researchers intended to commercialize their research results.127 
The court held that researchers have no duty to disclose financial or 
commercial conflicts of interest and that no fiduciary duty exists 
between "researchers" and "research participants."128 The court 
reasoned that the researchers were merely recipients of tissue dona­
tions, classifying the research participants as "donors" who lacked a 
special relationship to the researchers.129 The court further rea­
soned that since the parents did not enjoy a special relationship 
with researchers, no fiduciary duty existed between the researchers 
and the families. 130 
Greenberg is distinguishable from many medical research situ­
ations. The situation in Greenberg is best described as a "research 
collaboration gone sour" and does not reflect the typical research 
relationship.131 The parents in Greenberg provided financial sup­
port and assisted researchers in identifying similarly situated fami­
lies and recruiting them to the research trial.132 These parents 
contributed efforts toward the research itself; so, in the court's eyes, 
the parent-plaintiffs were more appropriately classified as research 
125. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Children's Hosp. Research Inst., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 
1067 (S.D. Fla. 2003); Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807, 811-12 (Md. 
2001); Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990). 
126. Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1067. 
127. Id. at 1068. 
128. Id. at 1070-72. 
129. Id. at 1070-71. 
130. Id. at 1070. 
131. Id. at 1066. 
132. Id. at 1067. 
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collaborators.133 Based on this classification, the court suggested 
that the parents could have protected their interests in preventing 
the commercialization of research findings,134 The Greenberg deci­
sion appears to excuse the exploitation of research participants who 
have donated themselves, their tissues, or their financial resources 
for the advancement of science.D5 The case would create a danger­
ous precedent if its holding were to extend to all medical research 
situations. 
In contrast, a research participant who is continually moni­
tored using disease management technology or who is in an ongoing 
relationship with researchers must be treated differently. Unlike 
the Greenberg and Moore participants, continually monitored par­
ticipants make an ongoing contribution to the clinical trial, and so 
they cannot be aptly described as mere tissue donors. Further­
more, unlike the parents in Greenberg, these participants are di­
rectly affected research participants and are not accurately 
classified as research collaborators since they do not assist in 
recruiting participants or contribute financial resources. Most re­
search participants, like continually monitored participants, are pre­
sumably not in a position to protect their financial or 
commercialization interests from the competing interests of medical 
research sponsors. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland136 has also addressed in­
formed consent in research. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute 
involved a Johns Hopkins University research program that mea­
sured the effects of various lead abatement strategies in certain 
classes of dated homes undergoing partial lead modifications,137 
The effectiveness of the lead abatement was measured by analyzing 
lead levels in the bloodstream of otherwise healthy children over 
the course of two years.D8 Landlords received public funding, in 
the form of grants or loans, and were encouraged to rent their 
dwellings to families with young children,139 The consent agree­
133. Id. at 1072-73. 
134. Kevin c.J. Oberdorfer, Note, The Lessons of Greenberg: Informed Consent 
and the Protection of Tissue Sources' Research Interests, 93 GEO. L.J. 365, 366 (2004). 
135. See Christopher Jackson, Learning From the Mistakes of the Past: Disclosure 
of Financial Conflicts of Interest and Genetic Research, 11 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 4, 24 
(2004). 
136. The Court of Appeals of Maryland is the highest court in the State. See 
Court of Appeals of Maryland, http://www.courts.state.md.us/coappeals. 
137. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807, 811-12 (Md. 2001). 
138. Id. at 812. 
139. Id. 
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ment used by researchers did not explain that the research was de­
signed to measure lead abatement or that the "researchers intended 
that the children be the canaries in the mines."14o 
Apparently, the IRB at Johns Hopkins University found noth­
ing wrong with the proposed research protocol or the fact that re­
search participants were not informed of the risks involved.141 In 
fact, despite the requirement that an IRB ensure the safety of 
human research participants, the IRB at Johns Hopkins University 
assisted researchers in circumventing safety requirements.142 
Grimes illustrates that IRBs may not offer adequate protection­
the IRB was able, but apparently unwilling, to protect research par­
ticipants. Rather, it looked beyond the interests of research partici­
pants to assist researchers. 
The IRB at the University of Pennsylvania has also been the 
target of criticism for its faulty protection of participants in a ge­
netic research experiment.143 In 1999, Jesse Gelsinger participated 
in a genetic research experiment studying the effects of a liver dis­
ease treatment.144 Although Gelsinger's physicians were success­
fully managing his condition, he consented, at the age of eighteen, 
to participate in a gene therapy experiment, allegedly without being 
properly informed of its risks, which resulted in a fatal immune sys­
tem reaction.145 Gelsinger did not expect the research to produce a 
direct benefit; after all, his disease was under control.146 Even 
though the Gelsinger matter eventually settled out of court, the im­
pact on the medical research community has been staggering.147 In­
formed consent had yielded to the pressures of research, not in an 
obscure research institution or foreign country lacking protections 
140. Id. at 813. Historically, canaries were used to determine whether dangerous 
levels of toxic gases existed in mines because canaries are particularly susceptible to 
certain toxic gases. [d. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 813-14. 
143. Complaint-Civil Action at 'lI9l 86-93, Gelsinger v. Trs. of the Univ. of Pa., 
No. 000901885 (Ct. Com. PI., Philadelphia County, Sept. 18, 2000), available at http:// 
www.sskrplaw.com/links/healthcare2.html; see also Paul Gelsinger, Forward to INSTITU· 
TIONAL REVIEW BOARD: MANAGEMENT AND FUNcrION, supra note 21, at xv, xviii. 
144. See Complaint-Civil Action at <JI 1, Gelsinger v. Trs. of the Univ. of Pa., 
supra note 143. 
145. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 839. 
146. Gelsinger, supra note 143, at xv, xviii. 
147. The FDA halted eight other gene therapy research projects at other institu­
tions after discovering "a number of serious problems in the ... informed consent pro­
cedures and ... a lapse in the researchers' ethical responsibilities to experimental 
subjects." Grimes, 782 A.2d at 838. 
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for human research participants, but at a highly prestigious research 
institution in the United States.148 As the facts in Grimes and the 
situation leading to Jesse Gelsinger's death illustrate, the "scientific 
and medical communities cannot ... assume sole authority to deter­
mine ultimately what is right and appropriate."149 
Revisiting Alexis 
Alexis feels misled. She intended to help scientists and physi­
cians study Huntington's disease. Instead, she was seriously and neg­
atively affected by the disclosure of her PHI. Because the medical 
community's reliance on the doctrine of informed consent and IRB 
oversight has failed to adequately protect Alexis, she now must seek 
protection through the legal system. 
V. 	 PROTECTING PARTICIPANTS BY HOLDING MEDICAL 
RESEARCHERS LIABLE 
Legal remedies can compensate research participants for the 
effects of the unauthorized disclosure of PHI. However, for there 
to be an entitlement to a legal remedy, a duty must first exist be­
tween researchers and research participants. A discussion of legal 
duty is presented below. This Part also identifies those individuals 
or entities that are subject to liability for failing to protect research 
participants by not adequately informing them of PHI disclosure 
practices and risks. 
A. Establishing a Duty Between Researchers and Participants 
Before a research participant may seek a legal remedy for 
harm suffered as a result of the disclosure of PHI, the participant 
must first establish that the defendant-researcher owed him or her a 
duty,150 Where a researcher provides medical treatment to a re­
search participant, the researching physician also has a doctor-pa­
tient relationship with the research participant, and therefore owes 
a duty of care to the patient-subject,151 A medical researcher, even 
if not a participant's treating physician, may still owe a duty of care 
to the research participant as the research participant "looks to the 
148. Id. at 839 (citing Jeffrey H. Barker, Human Experimentation of a Merciless 
Epoch, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 603, 617 (1999)). 
149. Id. at 817. 
150. Noah, supra note 2, at 208. 
151. /d. 
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investigator as an expert and places his trust in the investigator's 
expertise."152 
The court in Grimes held that research normally creates "spe­
cial relationships" resulting in duties, the breaches of which may 
ultimately result in liability.153 Other paths to establishing a legal 
duty between a researcher and research participant exist. For in­
stance, a duty can arise by virtue of a relationship, by contract, or 
directly from a statute, regulation, or rule. 154 
1. Nature of Research Relationships 
According to Grimes, there is no bright-line rule that estab­
lishes when a special relationship exists between a researcher and 
participant.155 Instead, the court used a fact-driven analysis to hold 
that "such research agreements can, as a matter of law, constitute 
'special relationships' ... [and] ... that, normally, such special rela­
tionships are created between researchers and the human subjects 
used by the researchers. "156 The Grimes court stated that "the very 
nature of ... scientific research on human subjects can, and nor­
mally will, create special relationships out of which duties arise."157 
The court justified its holding: "[W]e know of no law, nor have we 
been directed to any applicable [law] ... that provides that the par­
ties to a scientific study ... cannot be held to have entered into 
special relationships with the subjects of the study."158 
2. Contractual Relationships 
A duty can also arise by contract. The Grimes court held that 
informed consent agreements can constitute contracts.159 The court 
explained that by having a research participant sign a consent form, 
both the researcher and research participant expressly make repre­
sentations, creating a bilateral contract.160 The Grimes court found 
that a consent agreement suggests that a research participant agrees 
to participate in the research study, expecting that she will be "in­
formed of all the information necessary for [her] to freely choose 
152. Id. 
153. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 819. 
154. Id. at 842 (citing Bobo v. State, 697 A.2d 1371, 1375-76 (Md. 1997)). 
155. See id. 
156. [d. at 858 (emphasis added). 
157. Id. at 834-35. 
158. Id. at 834. 
159. [d. at 844. 
160. Id. at 843. 
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whether to participate ... and [will] receive promptly any informa­
tion that might bear on [her] willingness to continue to participate 
in the study."161 Information regarding the risk of mishandled PHI 
may directly influence an individual's choice to participate in a re­
search study. 
3. Statutes and Regulations 
A duty can also arise from the requirement to comply with 
statutes or regulations.162 For example, federal regulations guiding 
federally funded research impose standards of care in medical re­
search.163 The HHS and FDA regulations require adherence to 
"sound ethical principles,"164 including informing patients of "all 
risks that are reasonably foreseeable" or those that are well 
known.165 Although the federal regulations do not create a private 
right of action, the regulations recognize the existence of a common 
law duty to inform research participants.166 
Federal regulations further contemplate that a research partici­
pant will retain certain legal remedies. For example, researchers 
are prohibited from including language in the informed consent 
that would waive legal rights or "release the investigator, the spon­
sor, the institution or its agents [i.e., business associates] from liabil­
ity."167 Therefore, by not disclosing risks, such as actual PHI 
disclosure practices that would reasonably affect an individual's de­
cision to participate in research, those responsible for research stud­
ies could violate the very regulations that presume that, in addition 
to the research investigator, "the [research] institution or its IRB­
could be liable in negligence for injury to a research subject."168 
Failure to comply with the provisions contained within 
HIPAA's Privacy Rule also creates a basis for establishing a special 
relationship or duty, akin to the relationships and duties defined by 
the HHS and FDA regulations. HIPAA requires health care enti­
ties to comply with the standards set forth by HHS "to protect the 
161. Id. 
162. Id. at 846. 
163. Id.; see also 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2005) (HHS protections for human research 
subjects); 21 C.F.R. § 50.1 (2005) (FDA protections for human research subjects). 
164. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 848. 
165. Id. (citing Whitlock v. Duke Univ., 637 F. Supp. 1463, 1471, affd, 829 F.2d 
1340 (4th Cir. 1987)). 
166. Noah, supra note 2, at 216 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 50.20; 45 C.F.R. § 46.116). 
167. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116; see also 21 C.F.R. § 50.20. 
168. Noah, supra note 2, at 216. 
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security, confidentiality, and integrity of health information."169 
Failure to adequately protect PHI, or to adequately supervise busi­
ness associates with respect to handing PHI, breaches a duty owed 
to research participants, exposing researchers to liability. There­
fore, HIPAA's Privacy Rule, as it relates to protecting PHI in medi­
cal research, establishes a special relationship between researchers 
and participants.17o As a result, researchers have a duty to ade­
quately protect PHI and inform research participants of the risks of 
PHI disclosure associated with participation in the clinical trial. 
The breach of these duties should result in liability. 
B. 	 Failure to Inform Research Participants of PHI Disclosure 
Risks Exposes Multiple Parties to Liability 
Mishandling PHI in the medical research environment impli­
cates mUltiple parties. Liability extends beyond those directly re­
sponsible for disclosing PHI to unauthorized recipients. In fact, 
causes of action for negligence can be pursued against those gener­
ally responsible for medical research: IRBs, individual IRB mem­
bers, hospitals, business associates, research sponsors, and treating 
physicians. l71 
1. 	 IRBs 
Although tort lawsuits against IRBs are relatively rare, they 
have begun to increase.172 Research participants commonly en­
counter judgment-proof173 researchers and must look "higher up 
the chain of research oversight for a more promising defendant."174 
Given that IRBs, by regulation, may require additional disclosures 
from researchers that will meaningfully add to the protections of 
research participants, it follows that IRBs may be held liable for 
failing to request additional disclosures and for failing to investigate 
and warn participants of current research practices with respect to 
169. 	 Williams, supra note 66, at 373. 
170. 	 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164. 
171. See infra Part V.c. (using a claim of negligence to provide a remedy for 
Alexis). 
172. 	 Noah, supra note 2, at 207. 
173. A debtor is judgment-proof if he or she is "unable to satisfy a judgment for 
money damages because the person ... does not own enough property." BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 861 (8th ed. 2004). 
174. Noah, supra note 2, at 209. Institutions having IRBs normally have signifi­
cant financial resources derived from financial rewards related to research, whether 
received in the form of grants or similar compensation for housing a clinical trial within 
the walls of the institution. Id. at 210. 
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handling PHI.175 Requiring additional efforts and disclosures to in­
form participants, or protect them from the risks of unauthorized 
disclosure of PHI, is an IRB duty.176 
Holding an IRB responsible is sound because research partici­
pants are also considered third-party beneficiaries177 to research 
agreements and contracts, between the hospital, the IRB, and the 
researcher.178 Such agreements elevate research participants to 
third-party beneficiary status because participants are, by design, 
intended to benefit from the IRB's protection.179 To be sure, re­
search participants reasonably rely on the IRB for protection from 
the risks inherent in research in exchange for their participation.180 
IRBs may argue, in defense, that they cannot effectively supervise 
clinical research or the risks associated with participation in re­
search due to inadequate staffing or institutional support, financial 
or otherwise. However, such an explanation as to this factual find­
ing is likely to "fail to persuade a jury."181 
2. IRB members 
Individual IRB members do not enjoy the same immunity for 
their participation on the IRB as those individuals who serve on 
institutional peer review boards and receive legal immunity in ex­
change for candid evaluations of hospital physicians.182 In fact, the 
Grimes court explained that it was "not aware of any general legal 
precept that immunizes ... 'institutional volunteers' or scientific 
researchers from the responsibility for the breaches of duties arising 
in 'special relationships.' "183 Therefore, individual members of an 
175. 45 C.F.R. § 46.109(b) (2005); 21 CF.R. § 56.109(b) (2006). 
176. 45 CF.R. § 46.109(b); 21 CF.R. § 56.109(b). 
177. A third-party beneficiary is "[a] person who, though not a party to a con­
tract, stands to benefit from the contract's performance." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 
supra note 173, at 165. 
178. Noah, supra note 2, at 209. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. at 210. 
181. Id. at 219. 
182. Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, §§ 411­
12, 100 Stat. 3784, 3784-86 (codified at 42 U.S.C § 11111-12 (2000)) (immunity from 
and standards for professional review); see also William P. Gunnar, The Scope of a 
Physician's Medical Practice: Is the Public Adequately Protected by State Medical Licen­
sure, Peer Review, and the National Practitioner Data Bank?, 14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 
329, 344-49 (2005) (discussing legal immunity in peer review and credentialing in 
hospitals). 
183. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807, 834 (Md. 2001). 
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IRB are subject to liability for failing to protect research partici­
pants by not informing them of the risks of mishandled PHI. 
3. Hospitals 
Patients who are treated and injured in a hospital can bring 
claims against a hospital when peer review credentialing commit­
tees184 hire or retain a negligent physician.185 By analogy, research 
participants should also be in a position to recover from a hospital 
when its IRB fails to properly review, approve, or monitor human 
subject research within its facility by failing to provide participants 
with all material information. Vicarious liability also extends to 
hospitals for the actions of its employees or business associates per­
forming tasks requiring disclosure of PHJ.186 Healthcare institu­
tions that choose to utilize business associates would "become 
[liable] ... if another entity, such as a billing agent ... transmits 
health information on their behalf."187 
4. Business Associates 
Business associates disclosing PHI, either intentionally or unin­
tentionally, should also expect to face direct liability for injuries 
sustained from mishandled PHI, as business associates have con­
tracted to protect participants' health information.188 If the disclo­
sure of PHI results from an intentional act of an employee, a 
business associate may argue that the employee acted beyond the 
scope of employment.189 That argument would certainly be at­
184. Peer review credentialing is a hospital's internal process of admitting and 
retaining physicians by forming a committee of colleagues to provide candid evalua­
tions of physicians. See Grande v. Lahey Clinic Hosp., 725 N.E.2d 1083, 1085 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 2000) (explaining that peer review committees "promote uninhibited investi­
gation and expression of opinion" because their members enjoy immunity from legal 
liability); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 204(a) (2003) (stating "the proceedings, 
reports and records of a medical peer review committee shall be confidential"). 
185. Noah, supra note 2, at 211. 
186. 45 C.F.R. § 164.530(b )(1) (2005) ("A covered entity must train all members 
of its workforce on the policies and procedures with respect to protected health infor­
mation ...."). 
187. Williams, supra note 66, at 382. 
188. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(1) (explaining that a covered entity may release PHI 
to a business associate only if the "covered entity obtains satisfactory assurance that the 
business associate will appropriately safeguard the information"); 45 c.F.R. 
§ 164.504(e)(2)(ii)(D) (requiring that any agents of the business associate agree to the 
same conditions to protect PHI). 
189. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1958) (stating a "master is 
not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of their 
employment"). 
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tempted in cases where a particular employee has acted on his own 
accord and not within the policies or procedures of the business. 
However, a more persuasive argument is that the employer is ulti­
mately responsible because the employer failed to adequately su­
pervise the employee. For example, failing to monitor external e­
mail communications containing PHI may constitute a negligent act 
on behalf of a business associate. 190 
5. Research Sponsors 
Research sponsors, like the fictitious GenoPharm, may be held 
liable for failing to adequately inform research participants of the 
true risks inherent in current research practices. Since sponsors of 
multi-center research often take the responsibility of drafting the 
information and materials provided to research participants, it fol­
lows that research sponsors should be held liable for deficiencies in 
authorizations and informed consent agreements. 191 Furthermore, 
research sponsors directly benefit from research subjects' participa­
tion. It is unfair, therefore, to allow research sponsors to avoid lia­
bility for failing to disclose material risks when sponsors are in a 
position to control the content of uniform authorizations.192 
6. Physicians 
In cases where a researcher is also a treating physician, and a 
conflict of interest might alter his or her professional judgment, the 
physician-researcher has the highest level of fiduciary duty to the 
190. See id. § 219(2)(b) (stating that an employer can be held liable for inten­
tional torts of an employee acting outside the scope of employment if the employer is 
also negligent or reckless). In this case, the employer could have properly supervised or 
controlled e-mail transmissions of employees, especially those that contain PHI and 
those that appear to be transmitted to multiple recipients. 
191. Kubiak, supra note 16, at 788. 
192. However, since hospitals have differing methods for handling PHI in the 
healthcare setting, a research sponsor can argue that it lacks specific knowledge of ac­
tual disclosure practices and is not in a position to warn participants of associated risks. 
Nevertheless, a research sponsor who develops materials for participants must be re­
quired to disclose risks associated with common activities, such as exporting billing, 
data analysis, and medical monitoring operations. See McLean, supra note 65, at 215. 
In addition, there is an inherent conflict of interest in these situations, and therefore 
patients may be in even greater danger of remaining uninformed. For example, Ge­
noPharm's goal is for patients to agree to participate in medical research so that it may 
receive FDA approval of its products. At the same time, if GenoPharm had made a full 
disclosure to Alexis of how her PHI would be traveling the globe, Alexis would likely 
not have participated in the research trial, especially since she was not receiving any 
personal or therapeutic benefit. 
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patient-subject.193 Conflicts of interest are common to the medical 
research community,194 especially where a researcher has "per­
sonal, financial, or political interests that undermine his or her abil­
ity to meet or fulfill his or her primary professional, ethical, or legal 
obligations."195 When a physician has personal interests unrelated 
to the patient's health, the physician must disclose the presence and 
extent of these interests to the patient.196 A common conflict of 
interest exists where a physician acts in the dual capacity as a pri­
mary care physician and a researcher, requiring the physician to 
"deftly balance his recommendations."197 However, even in cases 
where a medical investigator is acting solely as a researcher, a spe­
cial relationship still exists.198 
C. Using a Negligence Claim to Provide a Remedy 
The discussion below outlines a negligence cause of action 
based on a failure to protect research participants by not warning 
them of the common practices of PHI disclosure and the risks asso­
ciated with these practices. To prove negligence, a plaintiff must 
establish the following elements by a preponderance of the evi­
dence: (1) that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, (2) that 
the defendant breached that duty, (3) that the plaintiff experienced 
actual harm or a legally recognized injury, (4) that the defendant 
was a cause in fact of the harm caused to plaintiff, and (5) that the 
defendant was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.199 
193. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990) 
("[A] physician must disclose personal interests unrelated to the patient's health, 
whether research or economic, that may affect the physician's professional judgment."). 
194. Jeffrey M. Drazen & Gregory D. Curfman, Financial Associations of Au­
thors, 346 NEW ENG. 1. MED. 1901, 1901-02 (2002) (explaining that the New England 
Journal of Medicine will refuse publication to physicians only in the event of significant 
financial interests in the manufacture of a product, versus the previous standard where 
any financial conflict would have resulted in withholding of publication). 
195. ADIL E. SHAMOO & DAVID B. RESNIK, RESPONSIBLE CONover OF RE· 
SEARCH 141 (2003). 
196. Moore, 793 P.2d at 483. 
197. Williams, supra note 19, at 69. Some research institutions have managed 
similar physician-researcher conflicts by utilizing third-party monitors. Id. at 73. Study 
enrollers explain to patients the amount and source of funding the physician will receive 
as a result of their participation in the clinical trial. Alternatively, consent monitors, 
employed by the IRB, can oversee the entire consent process. Id. at 73-74. 
198. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 846 (Md. 2001). 
199. 1 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 114 (2001); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 281-282 (1965) (identifying elements for a negligence cause of 
action and the standard for negligence liability). 
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First, assuming a court finds that researchers and participants 
enjoy a special relationship that creates a duty on behalf of the re­
searchers to adequately inform participants of the risks of PHI dis­
closure, the remammg elements of negligence must be 
demonstrated.20o 
Second, a research participant must establish that researchers 
breached their duty by failing to protect him or her as a research 
participant.20l In a negligence action, failure to comply with the 
Common Rule, FDA regulations, or HIPAA will provide the neces­
sary elements of duty, breach, and proximate cause, under the doc­
trine of negligence per se,202 so long as the research participant is 
within the class of persons protected by the statute and the injury, 
or risk of injury, is of the type the statute seeks to prevent.203 Since 
the Common Rule and FDA regulations aim to protect research 
participants and because HIPAA was implemented to protect the 
PHI of consumers, it follows that research participants fall within 
the class of persons protected by each statute.204 These statutes 
also recognize the risk of compromising an individual's PHI; there­
fore, the statutes establish a duty to inform participants of risks re­
lated to PHI disclosure given common disclosure practices among 
researchers, business associates, and sponsors. When a researcher 
violates federal statutes designed to protect research participants, 
liability flows from the "breach of statute rather than from demon­
200. See supra Part V.A. 
201. See supra Part V.A. 
202. Cf Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 815 (N.Y. 1920). "We must be on our 
guard, however, against confusing the question of negligence with that of the causal 
connection between the negligence and the injury." Id. at 816. "[T]he omission of a 
safeguard prescribed by statute ... is held not merely some evidence of negligence, but 
negligence in itself." Id. at 815. A statute or regulation designed to protect "is not to 
be brushed aside as a form of words." Id. at 816; see also Price v. Blood Bank of Del., 
Inc., 790 A.2d 1203, 1212-13 (Del. 2002) (finding "that the violation of a statute, or 
regulation having the force of statute, enacted for the safety of others is negligence in 
law or negligence per se"). 
203. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 14 (Tentative Draft No.1, 2001) ("An 
actor is negligent [per se] if, without excuse, the actor violates a statute that is designed 
to protect against the type of accident the actor's conduct causes, and if the accident 
victim is within the class of persons the statute is designed to protect."); see id. § 15 
(excused statutory violations are not negligence: reasonable care in an attempt to com­
ply with statute, confusing statutory requirements, etc.). 
204. See 45 c.F.R. §§ 46.101-.124 (2006) (HHS Common Rule); 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 
(2006) (FDA informed consent); 21 C.F.R. §§ 56.101-.124 (2006) (FDA institutional re­
view boards). 
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strative proof of how the [researcher] was at fault."205 In fact, it is 
unnecessary to show that a researcher's "actions were unreasona­
ble, [ or] how they foreseeably exposed the plaintiff to an undue risk 
of harm."206 
Healthcare institutions providing support for research activities 
will attempt to defend a statutory violation.207 For example, a hos­
pital may argue that its statutory violation is excused because it has 
taken reasonable measures to comply with federal privacy regula­
tions but that full compliance is cost-prohibitive.208 With little case 
law testing this defense, it is difficult to examine its merit given the 
federal requirement to comply with the Common Rule, FDA regu­
lations, and HIPAA. In any event, "[court] opinions tend to start 
with a discussion of IRB negligence in failing to protect a research 
subject from injuries and then work backwards to announce, or 
more often simply assume, the existence of a duty of care," leaving 
less room for a compliance defense.209 
Third, actual damages must be proven.210 The damages need 
not be the physical harm211 most often encountered in informed 
consent claims.212 The harm experienced in the event of unautho­
rized disclosure of PHI is comparable to the harm experienced in 
tort claims of assault, damage to reputation, and libel or slander.213 
205. David G. Owen, Proving Negligence in Modern Products Liability Litigation, 
36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1003, 1010 (2004) (discussing negligence per se excuses available to 
manufacturers in products liability contexts). 
206. Id. 
207. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, § 15. 
208. See P. Greg Gulick, E-Health and the Future of Medicine: The Economic, 
Legal, Regulatory, Cultural, and Organizational Obstacles Facing Telemedicine and 
Cybermedicine Programs, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 351, 384 (2002). 
209. Noah, supra note 2, at 214. 
210. 1 DOBBS, supra note 199, § 114. 
211. 2 DOBBS, supra note 199, § 311 (commenting that private information pub­
lished to others may be an invasion of privacy and emotionally harmful, therefore al­
lowing a cause of action to seek damages resulting from purely emotional harms 
unaccompanied by a physical injury). Even if claims in negligence are not successful, 
remedies can be found in "rules of privacy invasion or breach of confidence." ld.; see 
also id. § 460 (discussing rights in personality, or reputation, to address privacy inva­
sions that result in economic damages to the plaintiff). 
212. See, e.g., Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807, 812-13 (Md. 2001) 
(exposing healthy children to anticipated accumulation of lead in blood stream); see 
also Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 481 (Cal. 1990) (taking sam­
ples of blood, serum, skin, bone marrow, and sperm from patient unaware that tissues 
were used for research purposes); supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text (describ­
ing the death of Jesse Gelsinger, a research participant). 
213. See supra note 211. 
2007] PRIVACY IN MEDICAL RESEARCH: A BOTCHED EXPERIMENT 567 
Fourth, a research participant must demonstrate cause in fact, 
or actual cause.214 In medical research, mUltiple actors often share 
responsibility for inflicting a single indivisible injury-in this case, 
the effects of mishandled PHJ.215 Even though it may be difficult 
for a plaintiff to apportion responsibility among several tortfeasors, 
joint and severalliability216 becomes a useful tool to force defend­
ants to apportion fault amongst themselves.217 Joint and severallia­
bility prevents a defendant, such as an IRB, from being excused 
merely because the harm could have occurred in the absence of the 
IRB's failure to warn the plaintiff of risks inherent in current re­
search disclosure practices.218 Therefore, an IRB can remain as a 
defendant because the IRB can be considered either a cause in fact 
or a substantial factor in the disclosure of a research participant's 
PHI.2I9 
Finally, proximate cause must be determined.220 Proximate 
cause focuses on whether liability should be extended because the 
risk of harm was foreseeable.221 A violation of a statute or federal 
regulation, such as HHS, FDA, or HIPAA regulations, establishes 
proximate cause because the statute itself explicitly identifies the 
necessary foreseeable plaintiffs (research participants) and the fore­
seeable risks (loss of a privacy interest in PHI).222 
Generally, the foreseeability of the manner in which the injury 
occurs is irrelevant, as is the extent of the injury. However, an in­
tervening cause or act may terminate liability if the act itself is sig­
214. 1 DOBBS, supra note 199, § 114. 
215. For example, a hospital may have acted negligently in selecting a business 
associate and the business associate may have been negligent or reckless in disclosing 
PHI to unauthorized recipients. 
216. "Joint and several liability" is defined as "[ljiability that may be apportioned 
either among two or more parties or to only one or a few select members of the group 
.... [B]ut a paying party may have a right of contribution and indemnity from nonpay­
ing parties." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 173, at 933. 
217. See Landers v. E. Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co., 248 S.W.2d 731, 734 (Tex. 
1952) (finding that without imposing joint liability, "the plaintiff [WOUld be] in no better 
position to produce the required proof of the portion of the injury attributable to each 
of the defendants"). 
218. The issue is whether the release of PHI would have occurred but for the 
negligent act of the individual or entity. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26 cmt. b 
(Tentative Draft No.2, 2002) (but-for standard for factual cause). 
219. See id. § 26 cmt. j (explaining that when the but-for test fails and the release 
of PHI still would have occurred, a party may still be a cause in fact of the injury if the 
party is determined to be a substantial factor in causing the injury). 
220. 1 DOBBS, supra note 199, § 114. 
221. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100-01 (N.Y. 1928). 
222. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 14 (Tentative Draft No.1, 2001). 
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nificant.223 Such a cause would relieve a defendant of liability 
because the causal link between the defendant's negligent act and 
the eventual harm would have been broken by the intervening 
cause. A defendant, such as an IRB member, may attempt to es­
tablish that an act of disclosing PHI by a business associate is an 
intervening act that supersedes any liability. However, the risk of a 
business associate negligently or recklessly disclosing PHI to an un­
authorized recipient that results in a loss of career, loss of insurance 
coverage, damage to reputation, and economic damage, is the very 
same risk of failing to warn a research participant of common prac­
tices related to the disclosure of their PHI in medical research.224 
Therefore, those involved in research should not be permitted to 
place blame on the actions of a business associate in an effort to 
escape liability. 
Revisiting Alexis 
Alexis sought to advance scientific understanding of an incur­
able disease. However, she suffered damage to her reputation and 
lost her career because her disease was disclosed to her employer and 
members of her community as a direct result of her participation in 
the clinical trial. The medical research community relied on in­
formed consent, authorization, and IRB oversight to protect Alexis. 
When these measures failed, Alexis was forced to pursue a legal 
remedy. 
In addition to possible contractual claims, Alexis should succeed 
in a negligence cause of action against those involved in the clinical 
trial, including the hospital, its IRB, individualIRB members, busi­
ness associates, the research sponsor, and her physician, both as her 
treating physician and as a medical researcher. The medical re­
searchers had a duty to inform Alexis of disclosure risks. They 
breached this duty by not informing Alexis of the risks material to 
her as a research participant. Alexis will be successful in establishing 
that those involved in the clinical trial were an actual cause of her 
injury. Alexis can also establish that she was both a foreseeable 
223. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 173, at 234 (stating that an interven­
ing cause is "[a]n event that comes between the initial event in a sequence and the end 
result, thereby altering the natural course of events that might have connected a wrong­
ful act to an injury"). 
224. Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 414 N.E. 2d 666, 671 (N.Y. 1980) 
(finding that an intervening act does not sever liability "and relieve an actor of responsi­
bility, where the risk of the intervening act occurring is the very same risk" associated 
with the defendant's negligent act). 
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plaintiff and that the risks ofmishandled PHI were foreseeable, mak­
ing it fair to allow Alexis to recover damages. 
CONCLUSION 
The issue of liability condenses to one essential fact: most re­
search participants are not informed of everything that they need to 
know to make an informed decision to participate in a clinical trial. 
Warning prospective participants of the risks associated with mod­
ern practices of disclosing PHI must be a universal practice. To 
properly inform participants of the true risks associated with partic­
ipating in medical research, the medical research community must 
disclose actual business practices common to the industry. Prospec­
tive participants are the only ones who can make a truly informed 
decision whether to participate in medical research after balancing 
the benefits they expect to receive, if any, against the risks associ­
ated with participating in medical research. 
Such additional disclosures will not likely have a chilling effect 
on research participation. In fact, an increase in confidence in the 
medical research community may result. The medical or legal com­
munities can hardly condemn being forthright with all research-re­
lated risks in an effort to protect participants. If plaintiffs succeed 
in obtaining judgments against medical researchers, either the costs 
of medical research will increase, or the willingness of individuals to 
participate in research will decrease. Either event would require 
adjustments in the protections provided to research participants. 
However, not permitting research participants to recover damages 
resulting from unauthorized disclosure of PHI, merely because they 
chose to advance scientific knowledge by participating in a clinical 
trial, comes dangerously close to revisiting the distrust in medical 
research that led to the very developments designed to protect 
human research participants. 
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